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cerns when the combined market shares of participants are low enough. This
paper argues that existing theory does not support limiting the exemption to low
market shares. This is done by introducing a set of non-innovating outside firms
to the standard framework to assess what link might exist between the market
share of innovating firms and the product market benefits of cooperation. With
R&D output choices, the market share criterion, while it rules out the most so-
cially harmful R&D cooperation agreements, also hinders the most beneficial ones.
With R&D input choices, cooperation may actually be desirable in concentrated
industries, and harmful in more competitive ones. If R&D cooperation does have
anti-competitive eﬀects in product markets, it seems that these are therefore best
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1 Introduction
European competition law regulates so-called “horizontal” research and development (R&D)
agreements, whereby firms coordinate their R&D operations and jointly exploit the results,
while still competing in the marketplace. These agreements have pro-competitive virtues,
in that they permit participating firms to avoid the duplication of budgets, or to combine
complementary resources, toward innovative products and lower production costs. On the
other hand, antitrust authorities are concerned that horizontal R&D agreements may also
facilitate anti-competitive behavior at the market level, including the concerted formation of
prices. The current regime for the assessment of R&D cooperation agreements will expire
on 31st December 2010. In order to prepare the new regime to be applied after that date,
the European Commission has recently invited stakeholders to present their views on their
experiences in applying the existing rules. In the spirit of this consultation, in this paper
we oﬀer an economic assessment of a key feature of the regulation, which is the use of a
market share criterion to discriminate firms that will be exempted or not from the burden of
assessing the compatibility of their contractual relationships with the legislation.
In order to let consumers benefit from the pro-competitive eﬀects of horizontal R&D
cooperation, under the constraint that anti-competitive ones are filtered out, the European
Commission adopted the Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000.1 It sets limits to the application
of Article 81(1) of the Treaty on European Union that prohibits in principle all agreements
“which have as their object or eﬀect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market.” Regulation 2659 oﬀers a block exemption for R&D agreements.
It then establishes that “Article 81(1) shall not apply to agreements entered into between two
or more undertakings (...) which relate to the conditions under which those undertakings
pursue: (a) joint research and development of products or processes and joint exploitation of
the results of that research and development; (b) joint exploitation of the results of research
and development of products or processes jointly carried out pursuant to a prior agreement
between the same parties; or (c) joint research and development of products or processes
excluding joint exploitation of the results” (art. 1, added emphasis).
However, an important proviso of the regulation is that the block exemption applies “only
if, at the time the research and development agreement is entered into, the combined market
share of the participating undertakings does not exceed 25 % of the relevant market for the
1Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of
the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements.
2
products capable of being improved or replaced by the contract products” (Article 4(2), added
emphasis). It follows that only firms with little market power, typically small and medium-
sized businesses, benefit from a guarantee of legal validity. Larger companies must submit
to self-assessment the R&D cooperation they envisage, in order to evaluate compliance with
antitrust rules and decide to go ahead with the agreement.
The obligation for large firms to conduct their own assessment of the legality of R&D
cooperation agreements, in the light of the legislation in force, Commission guidelines, and
case-law, is a costly and uncertain process.2 Since it is not possible to seek legal protection
by notifying in advance the terms of the agreement to the competition authority, an existing
or candidate agreement must be proved not to infringe Article 81(1) in order to be valid
and enforceable. This occurs when the agreement can be shown to fulfil the conditions
of Article 81(3). These conditions are that (i) it contributes to improving the production
or distribution of products or to promoting technical or economic progress; (ii) it allows
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; and it does not (iii) impose restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of the above listed objectives; nor does it (iv) aﬀord
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question. The parties to a horizontal R&D agreement, with a combined market share above
the 25% threshold, bear the burden of proving that all four conditions are satisfied in order
to claim the benefit of Article 81(3).3 This is detailed in the accompanying guidelines, issued
by the Commission in 2001, on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal
cooperation agreements.4
The guidelines indicate clearly what is meant by economic progress: cooperation may
enable firms to oﬀer existing products “at lower prices” or result in a “better quality” (§32).
As for the fair share to consumers, they assert: “[g]enerally, the transmission of the benefits
to the consumers will depend on the intensity of competition within the relevant market.
Competitive pressures will normally ensure that cost-savings are passed on by way of lower
prices or that companies have an incentive to bring new products to the market as quickly
as possible. Therefore, if suﬃcient competition which eﬀectively constrains the parties to the
agreement is maintained on the market, the competitive process will normally ensure that
2For a detailed discussion on the legal uncertainty and the costs for the undertakings entailed by the current
EC antitrust enforcement rules, see Di Federico and Manzini (2004).
3See Mu¨ller (2004) for a detailed analysis of the applicability of Article 81(3) under the current antitrust
regime, and of the individual responsability of the parties to a horizontal agreement in assessing the compliance
of their practices with competition law.
4See European Commission (2001).
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the consumers receive a fair share of the economic benefits” (§34, added emphasis). This
describes a deep underlying motivation of the regulator for excluding large firms from the
block exemption. In more economic terms, R&D agreements are beneficial because of the
impact on consumer surplus. And according to the guidelines this impact is much more likely
to occur with a high degree of competition.
The market share criterion used by the regulator aﬀects the decision process of large firms
that may either rely exclusively on their proprietary R&D assets or opt for cooperation. It
is not easy for firms to show that they satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3). For example,
General Electric and Pratt & Whitney, which formed an alliance to develop an innovative
aircraft engine, had to go through a number of important obligations to respond to the ob-
servations of the Commission, although the new product was designed to meet an uncertain
demand on a market that did not exist yet.5 The regulatory pressure can also lead firms to
give up initial plans. Microsoft and Time Warner abandoned their project to jointly control
ContentGuard, a US entity specializing in the development and licensing of intellectual prop-
erty rights, after the Commission opened an in-depth investigation and expressed concerns
about anti-competitive aspects of the operation.6
In addition to self-assessment costs, before engaging unrecoverable resources the firms
excluded from the block exemption must weigh the risk of seeing the legality of an agreement
challenged by a client or a non-participating competitor. Should an infringement of Article
81(1) be detected, the competition authorities of the Member States and the Commission
may impose non-negligible fines or periodic penalty payments. The pecuniary sanctions can
attain up to 10 per cent of a firm’s total turnover in the preceding business year, and daily
penalties up to 5 per cent of the average daily turnover to secure compliance with a cease-
and-desist order.7 This forms negative incentives, as faced by firms with high market shares,
to participate in a horizontal R&D cooperation agreement under the current antitrust rules.8
5The obligations included a limitation of the design of the engine for only precisely identified aircrafts, the
yearly submission of accounting and auditing records to the Commission, and other safeguards to prevent the
exchange of competitively sensitive information among the parties. See the Oﬃcial Journal, 2000 L58/16, and
Van Bael & Bellis (2005) for comments.
6See the initiation of proceedings, in Case COMP/M.3445 Microsoft/Time Warner/ContentGuard/JV,
Oﬃcial Journal, 2004 C245/5.
7See articles 23 and 24 in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implemen-
tation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
8Law experts also point to the costs of the regulation for firms that are excluded from the block exemption.
For example, Anderman (2002) observes that EC competition law “acts as a detailed regulator of R&D agree-
ments with a aim of discouraging cooperation that is a tool to engage in disguised cartel or to foreclose markets
4
The main issue of this paper is whether the market share criterion successfully facilitates
the R&D agreements that are most beneficial to consumers. In particular, we ask whether this
criterion is consistent with the most standard theory of R&D cooperation (d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992), Amir, Evstigneev, and Wooders (2003),
among others).9 Ex-ante symmetric firms, in a Cournot oligopoly, compete on a market for
homogeneous products. A subset of these firms may engage in R&D activity to enhance the
quality of their products or reduce the marginal costs of production (satisfying the condition
of “economic progress”). These firms may choose R&D decisions either cooperatively or
non-cooperatively, before selling to consumers (whose surplus is shown to increase with R&D
levels, hence they receive a “share of the resulting benefit”).10
Our finding is that existing theory does not support limiting the exemption to low market
shares. We derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for cooperation to result in more
R&D than competition, consequently in more consumer surplus, and apply it to several
specifications of the R&D stage of the model. In the simplest setup that theory provides,
where firms’ decisions are R&D results (or “outputs”), we obtain that the regulation actually
hinders the best agreements, where R&D cooperation is most beneficial to consumers, by only
exempting from regulatory control those collaborations whose impact on consumer surplus is
relatively negligible. Then, turning to cases where firms choose the level of R&D expenditure
(or “inputs”), we see that the relationship between market share and the relative benefit
of R&D cooperation can in fact be the opposite of what Regulation 2659 presumes. R&D
cooperation can actually penalize consumers when the market share of the cooperating firms
is lower than the regulatory threshold. Beyond the threshold, the higher the ex-ante market
share of the cooperating firms, the greater the benefit of the agreement for consumers. In
that case the regulation penalizes cooperation precisely when economic analysis indicates
such agreements would benefit consumers.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and oﬀers the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for consumer surplus to be higher under R&D cooperation
than competition. Section 3 applies the condition to standard specifications to reveal non-
univocal connections between consumer surplus and innovating firms’ ex-ante market share.
but ending up possibly discouraging investments in such joint ventures that might have been encouraged by
a more user-friendly legal framework” (p. 305, added emphasis).
9Thus, we model firms that do not collude tacitly. For an analysis of the connection between R&D
cooperation and collusion, see Martin (1996).
10As there is no collusion, and we focus on equilibria in which non-innovating firms participate by selling
positive outputs, conditions (iii) and (iv) of Article 81(3), as listed above, are satisfied.
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2 R&D and Market Shares
The industry consists of n firms indexed on N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Firms face inverse
demands, pi = αi − qi −
P
j 6=i qj , i, j ∈ N , where the parameter αi measures the vertical
quality of firm i’s product, and there is a constant marginal cost ci.11 Initially, both αi
and ci are the same across firms. The variable profit of a given firm i is thus bπi (q) =³
ai − qi −
P
j 6=i qj
´
qi, with q = (q1, . . . , qn) and ai = αi − ci. A subset M = {1, . . . ,m}
of firms engages in research and development activity ex-ante, by each choosing a decision
variable zi ∈ R+. Below, we successively consider the cases where zi is an R&D output
and where it is an R&D input. The choice z = (z1, . . . , zm) acts on the parameters ai,
hereafter ai (z). It can be interpreted as either a quality improvement or a cost reduction.
There are non-negative technological spillovers, not only between the m firms that conduct
R&D, but also from the firms that conduct R&D to those that do not, although these are
lesser.12 R&D eﬀects are symmetric within the two groups of firmsM and N \M . Finally, the
R&D decision zi has a cost, symmetric across the m innovating firms, g (zi). The full profit
functions are therefore πi (q, z) =
³
ai (z)− qi −
P
j 6=i qj
´
qi − g (zi), i ∈ M , and πk (q, z) =³
ak (z)− qk −
P
j 6=k qj
´
qk, k ∈ N \M .
Two games are compared. In the first game, R&D competition, firms play a two-stage
non-cooperative game. The timing of the non-cooperative game is as follows. In the first stage,
the m innovating firms simultaneously decide their levels of zi. In the second stage, given the
variable profit intercepts ai (z), all n firms engage in quantity competition. The equilibrium
of the quantity competition stage is denoted by q∗ (z), and assumed to be diﬀerentiable in
z. Assume that suﬃcient conditions in the style of Amir et al. (2003) hold, so that this
first game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in R&D decisions that we denote by zn. In
the second game, R&D cooperation, the R&D decision is made collectively by all innovating
firms. The timing of the cooperative game is as follows. As a first stage, these m firms
11This inverse demand function can be derived as a limit case, as γ → 1, of a utility function described in
Ha¨ckner (2000), that is: U (q, I) = I +
S
i∈N αiqi − 12
S
i∈N q
2
i + 2γ
S
i6=j qiqj

, which is quadratic in the
consumption of q-products and linear in the consumption of the composite I-good (i.e., the numeraire). The
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) measures product horizontal substitutability.
12At least a part of the spillovers received by firms, including non-innovating entities, are involuntary leak-
ages. In a seminal empirical paper, Mansfield (1985) has found that information concerning the detailed nature
and operation of a new product or process generally leaks out to competitors within about a year. However,
when firms engage in R&D, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have shown that they increase the eﬀectiveness of
incoming spillovers. This is captured here by the inequality β ≥ β0. See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for
the empirical evidence.
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choose z to maximize the sum of their profits. In a second stage, non-cooperative quantity
competition ensues. Finally, assume that the joint profits Π (z) =
P
i∈M π
i (q∗ (z) , z) are
a twice diﬀerentiable, strictly quasiconcave function of z with a unique symmetric optimum
that we denote by zc.13
We may now characterize the diﬀerence between zc and zn. The following proposition
gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for cooperation to result in more R&D than competi-
tion, therefore in more consumer surplus, which is presumably the objective of the regulator.14
Proposition 1. Consumer surplus is higher under R&D cooperation than under competition
if and only if
(1− s)
µ
∂ai
∂zj
(zn)− ∂ak
∂zj
(zn)
¶
+
1
n
µ
2
∂ai
∂zj
(zn)− ∂aj
∂zj
(zn)
¶
> 0, (1)
with i 6= j, i, j ∈M , k ∈ N \M , and s = mn .
Proof. See the appendix. ¥
In the specifications that follow we shall see that zn in fact often drops out. There are two
terms in (1). The second term depends on the diﬀerence 2∂ai(z)∂zj −
∂aj(z)
∂zj
, which is standard
in the literature, where most papers feature a model with m = n. It becomes less and less
important as the total number of firms n rises. The first term appears whenever N\M is non-
empty, as in many real-world situations. This suggests that the influence of firm numbers,
and thereby market share s = mn , rests largely on the sign of the diﬀerence
∂ai(z)
∂zj
− ∂ak(z)∂zj .
One might think that R&D decisions have more impact on innovators in M than on other
firms, so that the latter diﬀerence is positive. This holds in particular when the impact of
firms’ decisions on product quality or the marginal cost is linear, as commonly assumed in
many models. However, as the latter part of analysis with R&D inputs will show, this is not
always true.
The logic of the proposition is actually more general. In fact, as detailed in the proof, the
comparison of zc and zn depends on the sign of a derivative, which can be broken down into
13For suﬃcient conditions toward a symmetric optimum in R&D decisions, see Leahy and Neary (2005).
14In the prolegomena of Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000, enhanced consumer satisfaction is clearly estab-
lished as the motivation for exempting cooperation agreements that result in more R&D: “Consumers can
generally be expected to benefit from the increased volume and eﬀectiveness of research and development
through the introduction of new or improved products or services or the reduction of prices brought about by
new or improved processes” (para. 12, added emphasis).
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a direct and indirect eﬀect, that is ∂π
i
∂zj
+
P
l 6=i
∂πi
∂q∗l
∂q∗l
∂zj
, with i 6= j, i, j ∈ M . The sign of the
first term, a direct eﬀect, is always positive. On the other hand the sign of the second term,
an indirect eﬀect, is indeterminate without more information on the impact of R&D on cost
and demand parameters. An economic rationale for current exemption policy would be an
assertion regarding the sensitivity of the sign of the derivative to the ex-ante market share
of the innovating firms, that is s. We do not see on what grounds such an assertion would
be made, in particular with regards to the indirect eﬀect term, which is not clearly related
to market share.
Before focusing on more specified versions of the model, as encountered in the liter-
ature, note that the decomposition into direct and indirect eﬀects is fairly general as it
relates to many second stage product market interactions. In the case of homogeneous
goods and cost-reducing R&D, the second (indirect) eﬀect would be q∗iD
0(Q∗)∂Q
∗
−i
∂zj
, where
Q∗−i =
P
k∈N\{i} q
∗
k, for an arbitrary inverse demand function D(Q). Moreover, a similar
condition arises with price instead of quantity competition in the second stage.
3 R&D Cooperation Impact is Independent of Market Shares
In this section we concentrate on standard specifications. This authorizes tractable com-
putations that reveal counter-intuitive connections, in Regulation 2659, between consumer
surplus and innovating firms’ ex-ante market share. Two specifications of the R&D process
are considered successively in the rest of this section. The first is output choice, in the style
of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The other one is input choice, as in Kamien et al.
(1992), and Amir et al. (2003).
3.1 Cooperation in output choices
Following d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), let xi denote firm i’s R&D output decision.15
The cost function is γ2x
2
i for the purpose of obtaining the example in Figure 1, although the
nature of results (condition (3)) is unaﬀected if a more general cost function, as suggested in
Amir et al. (2008), is adopted. The ai (x) functions are specified as
ai (x) = a+ xi + β
X
j 6=i
xj , i ∈M and ak (x) = a+ β0
X
M
xj , k ∈ N \M , (2)
15Recalling that ai = αi − ci, in order to circumvent the issue of non-negative marginal cost, assume here
that R&D is of the product kind (it impacts αi).
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where β0 ∈ [0, 1] is a technological “natural” spillover rate in the industry (see Amir et al.
(2003)), and β ∈ [β0, 1] is the spillover rate between innovating firms. With this specifica-
tion, a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, and a unique cooperation outcome can be
computed, for γ suﬃciently high.16 Then (1) becomes,
(1− s) (β − β0) +
2β − 1
n
> 0. (3)
For suﬃciently high spillovers (β > 12), R&D cooperation always dominates R&D competi-
tion. For a given industry size n, (3) is less likely to hold as the market share s of R&D
collaborating firms increases. This would seem to provide support for Regulation 2659. How-
ever, fixing m and letting industry size vary illustrates how the relationship between market
share and the relative consumer surplus CS
c
CSn is not monotonic.
0.0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
market share
spillover
Figure 1: Level curves of CS
c
CSn at 1% intervals. (i) For β = 1, an increase in s results in relative
gains to cooperation for consumers; (ii) For β in the neiborhood of 1/2, the relationship
between s and the relative consumer surplus is non monotonic; (iii) If innovating firms may
not collaborate for s > 0.25, the most desirable level curves are ruled out.
Figure 1 plots the level curves of the relative consumer surplus with R&D cooperation,
CSc
CSn (for β0 = 0, m = 2 and γ = 10). The solid line represents values for which
CSc
CSn = 1.
16Taking m = 2 and β0 = 0, as in Figure 1, the symmetric equilibrium values are xn =
2(n−β)a
γ(n+1)2−2(n−β)(n−1)(β+1) and x
c = 2(n−1)(β+1)aγ(n+1)2−2(n−1)2(β+1)2 , in the non-cooperative and cooperative cases, re-
spectively, with n ≥ 2, β ∈ [0, 1], a > 0 and γ > 2.
9
Its slope is positive throughout, indicating that, for β < 12 , the lower the market share,
the more likely it is that R&D cooperation dominates. The dashed (dotted) curves indicate
values for which CS
c
CSn = 1 + 0.01k (−0.01k), k ∈ N. We can make three remarks that cast
doubt on Regulation 2659. Consider first the case β = 1 for clarity. Then an increase in
s results in relative gains to cooperation for consumers.17 Next, consider the spillover rate
β in the neighborhood of 12 . Then the relationship between s and the relative consumer
surplus is non monotonic. Finally, consider the vertical line at s = 0.25, which represents the
threshold beyond which innovating firms may not benefit from the exemption of Regulation
2659. Clearly the most desirable level curves, in the North-East of the figure, are ruled out.
In order to avoid the worst outcomes, the regulation actually impedes the best, only allowing
those whose impact on consumer welfare is relatively negligible.
3.2 Cooperation in input choices
Consider next R&D competition in input choice (that is, where R&D expenditure is the
strategic variable), in the style of Kamien et al. (1992). Input and output choices are
compared in Amir (2000) and Amir et al. (2008), the former being found to satisfy a general
criterion regarding R&D technology and the spillover process. Let yi denote firm i’s R&D
input decision. The R&D cost function is then simply yi. Here the ai (y) functions are
specified as
ai (y) = f
⎛
⎝yi + β
X
j 6=i
yj
⎞
⎠ , i ∈M and ak (y) = f
Ã
β0
X
M
yj
!
, k ∈ N \M , (4)
where β0 ∈ [0, 1] is a natural spillover rate and β ∈ [β0, 1] is now the rate at which R&D
spending spills over between innovating firms. The R&D production function f is generally
assumed to satisfy a number of Inada-like conditions Amir et al. (2003), Kamien et al. (1992).
In particular, f is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, concave, and bounded. Let
Y nj = (1 + β (m− 1)) yn denote the equilibrium eﬀective R&D spending for innovating firms
in the non-cooperative game, and Y nk = β0my
n denote the equilibrium eﬀective R&D spending
for non-innovating firms. Then, with this specification, (1) becomes
(1− s)
£
βf 0
¡
Y nj
¢
− β0f 0 (Y nk )
¤
+
2β − 1
n
f 0
¡
Y nj
¢
> 0. (5)
17Recent theoretical analyses of R&D joint-ventures in which firms may control information flows predict
a high endogenous level of spillovers (see for example Amir et al. (2003)). This is also well empirically
documented in the European economy (see in particular Belderbos et al. (2004)).
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This condition is more elaborate than its analog (3) above, and reveals a key diﬀerence
between the two frameworks. An increase in market share s had an unambiguous eﬀect on the
left-hand term of the inequality (3). In the case of R&D input choice as generally modeled,
this is no longer true. Higher industry size (or lower market share for the innovating firms)
can lead to reversal, whereby cooperation is desirable at high market share but harmful at low
market share. This consideration goes squarely against the apparent rationale of Regulation
2659. It is related to the nature of competition in R&D, via the term βf 0
³
Y nj
´
− β0f 0 (Y nk ).
Because of diﬀering spillovers the eﬀective R&D spending is lower for non-innovating firms
(β0m < (1 + β (m− 1))), and since R&D production is a concave function, the marginal
productivity of R&D spending at yn can be higher for non-innovating firms. This can result
in a negative coeﬃcient for 1 − s, hence in a reversed sensitivity of (1) to market share.
Note that, without introducing more specification, in principle this eﬀect can arise for β0
arbitrarily small so long as it is non zero.
The next example illustrates reversal for a common specification of the R&D production
function (see Amir (2000), Amir et al. (2003) and Amir et al. (2008)).
Example: R&D production a` la Amir The following specification for an R&D
production process, suggested by Amir (2000), fits much of the spirit of the assumptions of
Kamien et al. (1992), although the shift of the variable profit intercept is not a bounded
function of y:
ai = a+
vuuut2
γ
⎛
⎝yi + β
X
j 6=i
yj
⎞
⎠, i ∈M and ak = a+
s
2
γ
β0
X
M
yj , k ∈ N \M . (6)
There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and a unique cooperative octane, for β0 and
β close to 1.18 Here, condition (5) reduces to
(n−m)
"
β − β0
s
1 + (m− 1)β
mβ0
#
+ 2β − 1 > 0. (7)
18Note that innovating firms’ profit is a piecewise-defined function. Because of the asymmetry between
innovating and non-innovating firms, the profit functions of the former may be non-diﬀerentiable when the
non-negativity constraint binds the latter in the quantity stage. Taking m = 2 and β0 = β, as in Figure
2, the symmetric equilibrium values are yn =

aΓ1
1−Γ1Γ2
2
and yc =

aΓ3
1−Γ2Γ3
2
in the non-cooperative and
cooperative cases, respectively, with the algebraic expressions Γ1 = (n+ 1)−2

n−β√
1+β − (n− 2)
t
β
2
t
2
γ ,
Γ2 = (n− 1)
t
2
γ (1 + β) − 2 (n− 2)
t
β
γ , and Γ3 = (n+ 1)
−2 (n− 1)√β + 1− (n− 2)√β
√
2
t
2
γ . For y
n
and yc to be well defined, it must be the case that Γ1Γ2 < 1 and Γ2Γ3 < 1, respectively.
11
Here the coeﬃcient of n can be negative, so that reversal arises. This occurs if β0 ∈³
mβ2
1+(m−1)β , β
i
, with β < 1. Figure 2 illustrates such a reversal. R&D cooperation penal-
izes consumers when the market share of the cooperating firms is lower than the regulatory
threshold (s < 0.25). Beyond the threshold, the higher the ex-ante market share of the
innovative firms, the greater the benefit of R&D cooperation for consumers. Regulation
2659 hinders cooperation precisely when economic analysis indicates such agreements would
benefit consumers.
10
1
market share
Figure 2: CS
c
CSn for s in (0, 1], with γ = 4, β = β0 = 0.65, m = 2. R&D cooperation is
never beneficial to consumers when s < 0.25. It is beneficial to consumers only beyond the
threshold.
4 Conclusion
Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000, and accompanying guidelines, reflect the laudable objective
to make consumers benefit from the virtues of R&D cooperation, while filtering out arrange-
ments that may result in anti-competitive behavior. By introducing a market share criterion,
so that only firms with limited sales may collaborate in R&D within “safe harbours”, the reg-
ulation hinders the technological collaboration of larger suppliers. When firms have a high
combined market share, horizontal R&D agreements take place in a more uncertain legal
environment. The parties bear the burden of self-assessing the compatibility of their con-
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tractual relationships vis-a`-vis the legislation, and face the risk of incurring severe pecuniary
sanctions in case of infringement.
In order to test the regulation from a theoretical economic viewpoint, we have established
by means of a standard model that the connection between market shares and the benefit of
R&D cooperation to consumers, is not univocal. It can actually be the opposite of what the
regulation presumes. A low combined market share, for the cooperating firms, is no guar-
antee of better products or lower costs, hence of more consumer surplus. R&D cooperation
can penalize consumers, in comparison to R&D competition, when the market share of the
cooperating firms is lower than the regulatory threshold. Moreover, more competition in an
industry can even lead to lower benefits of R&D cooperation to consumers.
The current regime for the assessment of horizontal R&D agreements aims to make con-
sumers benefit from the virtues of inter-firm cooperation, by guaranteeing that “suﬃcient
competition which eﬀectively constrains the parties to the agreement is maintained” (Eu-
ropean Commission (2001) guidelines, §32), and under the constraint not to facilitate anti-
competitive behavior at the market stage. Our message is that the regulation by focusing too
closely on the competition dimension, via market shares, loses sight of the raison d’eˆtre of the
R&D block exemption. When it discourages the formation of the most eﬃcient agreements,
it institutionalizes an adverse selection mechanism.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis calls for both simplification and specialization.
The simplification of the R&D block exemption by withdrawing the market share criterion
would eliminate the disincentives to R&D cooperation faced by large firms. In that case
the regulation would specialize on the objective that motivates its revision, leaving aside the
detection and prosecution of welfare-reducing behavior to other dedicated competition rules.
5 Appendix
5.1 Equilibrium of the Cournot subgame and consumer surplus
Given z, each firm chooses output to maximize its gross profits. Assuming an interior equi-
librium, this yields a set of n symmetric first-order conditions, which we use to solve for each
firm’s subgame Cournot-Nash equilibrium output, that is
q∗i (z) = ai (z)−
P
N aj (z)
n+ 1
, (8)
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all i ∈ N . The total equilibrium quantity is
Q∗ (z) =
P
N aj (z)
n+ 1
, (9)
and the resulting consumer surplus is
CS (z) =
1
2
µP
N aj (z)
n+ 1
¶2
. (10)
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The consumer surplus, as in (10), is an increasing function of zi, all i ∈M . For a comparison
of the consumer surplus in equilibrium across the R&D competition and cooperation games,
compute the total derivative of Π : Rm+ → R, that is
dΠ (z) =
X
i∈M
∂πi
∂zi
dzi +
X
i∈M
X
j∈M,j 6=i
∂πi
∂zj
dzj . (11)
Next, evaluate at z = zn the two partial derivatives that appear in the expression above, for
πi = πi (q∗ (z) , z), to get
∂πi
∂zi
¯¯¯¯
z=zn
= 0 and
∂πi
∂zj
¯¯¯¯
z=zn
= q∗i
⎛
⎝∂ai
∂zj
−
X
k∈N\{i}
∂q∗k
∂zj
⎞
⎠ , (12)
all i, j ∈ M , i 6= j. The zero value of ∂πi∂zi results directly from the first-order condition for
a NE in R&D decisions. The value of ∂π
i
∂zj
is obtained by recalling that ∂π
i
∂q∗i
∂q∗i
∂zj
= 0 from
the first-order condition for a NE in quantities, and also by observing that ∂π
i
∂ai
∂ai
∂zj
= q∗i
∂ai
∂zj
and ∂π
i
∂q∗j
∂q∗i
∂zj
= −q∗i
∂q∗i
∂zj
from the specification of demand functions. Next, recall that firms are
ex-ante symmetric to focus on the R&D vectors z verifying z1 = . . . = zm = z, so that joint
profits on M can be expressed as a function Π : R+ → R, which is strictly quasi-concave in
z. In that case the maximizer zc is strictly greater than zn if and only if dΠ(z)dz
¯¯¯
z=zn
> 0.
From (11) and (12) the latter condition can now be rewritten as
∂ai
∂zj
−
X
k∈N\{i}
∂q∗k
∂zj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
zj=zn
> 0, (13)
all i, j ∈ M , i 6= j, and all q∗i > 0. Concentrate on the second term in (13). We haveX
k∈N\{i}
∂q∗k
∂zj
= ∂Q
∗
∂zj
− ∂q
∗
i
∂zj
, with
∂q∗i
∂zj
= ∂ai∂zj −
∂Q∗
∂zj
from (8-9). Then observe, again from (9), that
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∂Q∗
∂zj
= 1n+1
P
N
∂al
∂zj
, and that ∂al(z)∂zj =
∂ai(z)
∂zj
for all l ∈ M\{j} by symmetry. It follows that
the condition in (13) simplifies to
∂ai
∂zj
− 1
n+ 1
µ
∂aj
∂zj
+ (m− 1)∂ai
∂zj
+ (n−m)∂ak
∂zj
¶¯¯¯¯
zj=zn
> 0,
all i, j ∈ M , i 6= j, and k ∈ N \M . Multiplying by n + 1 and rearranging terms gives the
desired result. ¥
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